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But That Is Absurd! 
WHY SPECIFIC ABSURDITY UNDERMINES 
TEXTUALISM* 
Linda D. Jellum† 
INTRODUCTION 
With 2010 being the twenty-fifth year since Justice 
Scalia joined the Supreme Court and revived textualism,1 I 
could not resist exploring and critiquing the absurdity 
doctrine,2 a doctrine used by Justice Scalia and other 
  
 * © 2011 Linda D. Jellum. All rights reserved. 
 † Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. I would like to 
thank Lawrence Solan, Rebecca Kysar, and the Brooklyn Law Review for inviting me to 
contribute to this symposium. I would also like to thank Shelia Scheuerman, Charleston 
Law School, and the participants in Southeastern Law Scholars Conference for offering 
me an opportunity to present this article while it was still a work in progress. Finally, 
David Ritchie and Suzianne Painter-Thorne provided valuable suggestions. Invaluable 
research assistance was provided by Courtney Ferrell, J.D. expected 2011, and John Nick 
Phillips, J.D. expected 2012. Any remaining errors are mine alone. 
 1 Adherents of textualism, a theory of statutory interpretation, look for the 
objective meaning of statutory language primarily in the text of the statute. Andrew S. 
Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
25, 31 (2006). In contrast, adherents of intentionalism look for the subjective intent of the 
legislature when it enacted the statute. Id. at 32. “To be sure, the border between 
textualism and intentionalism is not always obvious. By and large, however, 
intentionalists are interested in the meaning a statute actually had to its authors, while 
textualists are interested in the meaning it would have to a competent reader.” Id. at 32-
33. As some have posited, the justices do not always do what theory suggests they should. 
See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (2006) (finding a 
strong relationship between a justice’s political views and his or her Chevron rulings). 
 2 When the ordinary meaning of a statute would lead to absurd results, courts 
will seek an alternative reading of the statutory text pursuant to the absurdity doctrine. 
Relatedly, when a statute contains a drafting error, courts will correct the statute 
pursuant to the scrivener’s error doctrine. While related, these doctrines are distinct. For 
a more thorough discussion of the absurdity doctrine, see Veronica M. Dougherty, 
Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory 
Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127 (1994); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003). For a more thorough discussion of the scrivener’s error 
doctrine, see Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About 
Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309 (2001). 
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textualists3 to counter the sometimes harsh results of applying 
clear statutory language. In this article, I explore an aspect of 
the absurdity doctrine not yet explored in legal scholarship:4 
namely, the difference between specific and general absurdity.5 
Statutes that are specifically absurd are those statutes that are 
absurd as applied to the facts of a particular case, but not 
absurd as applied generally. For example, a statute that 
penalizes individuals from escaping from prison is absurd as 
applied to an individual who escaped from a prison that was on 
fire, but is not absurd in general.6 In contrast, statutes that are 
generally absurd are those statutes that are patently absurd as 
written and, thus, as applied generally, to a group of 
individuals. For example, a statute that creates a waiting 
period rather than a deadline for a litigant to file an appeal is 
absurd in all cases, not just one isolated case.7  
This distinction has not been noticed in either the 
jurisprudence or scholarship; however, the difference matters. 
Accepting for the moment that the absurdity doctrine has force 
when the legislature drafts a statute that as written “would 
lead to patently absurd consequences that Congress could not 
possibly have intended,”8 the question is whether the absurdity 
doctrine should have force when Congress drafts a statute that 
Congress intended but that has unintended consequences in 
only one particular case. Arguably no, as I explain below. 
Textualists should be particularly loath to apply the doctrine in 
cases of specific absurdity because specific absurdity, unlike 
general absurdity, is not readily apparent from the text of the 
  
 3 See Manning, supra note 2, at 2420 n.123 (cataloguing opinions by noted 
textualists Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook that rely on the absurdity doctrine); 
see, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 449 n.4 
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A possibility so startling (and unlikely to occur) is well 
enough precluded by the rule that a statute should not be interpreted to produce 
absurd results.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(stating that “a court should implement the language actually enacted—provided the 
statute is not internally inconsistent or otherwise absurd”). 
 4 While the absurdity doctrine has come under fire recently from some noted 
textualist scholars, none have addressed the specific versus general distinction. See, 
e.g., Manning, supra note 2. 
 5 The definitions that follow are my definitions. I explain both definitions in 
more detail infra text accompanying notes 72-101. 
 6 See, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868) 
(discussing this medieval case). 
 7 See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit 
Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 8 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (quotations omitted). 
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statute alone and the statute, as written and generally applied, 
was exactly what Congress intended. Yet it is precisely when 
statutes are specifically absurd that judicial intervention is 
most essential. In my view, absurdity and textualism are 
simply incompatible; indeed, the absurdity doctrine 
undermines the very foundation of textualism.9 
In Parts I and II of this article, I briefly describe first 
textualism and then absurdity. In Part III, I discuss the 
development of the absurdity doctrine. Then, in Part IV, I 
create and explore the differences between specific and general 
absurdity, an aspect currently unidentified in the literature. 
Finally, in Part V, I explain why absurdity, and most notably 
specific absurdity, undermines textualism. 
I. TEXTUALISM: A BRIEF PRIMER 
To understand the role that absurdity plays in 
interpretation, you must first understand textualism. 
Textualism is a method of statutory interpretation that focuses 
almost exclusively on the text of the statute and other intrinsic 
sources of meaning.10 Textualists “look for the public meaning 
of the words used in the statute as of the time the statute was 
drafted.”11 They are deeply skeptical of non-text-focused 
methods of interpretation—particularly those methods that 
seek the enacting legislature’s intent—for three principal 
reasons.12 First, textualists doubt that only one such intent 
  
 9 See Manning, supra note 2, at 2391 (arguing that “[i]f one accepts the 
textualist critique of strong intentionalism, it is difficult to sustain the absurdity 
doctrine on alternative grounds as some have attempted to do”). 
 10 Intrinsic sources include materials that are part of the official text being 
interpreted. The statute’s words are the most important intrinsic source. John M. 
Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 338 
(1976) (stating that the first step in the interpretation process is always “Read the 
statute. Read the Statute. Read the Statute.”). For a discussion of the types of sources, 
see LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13-15 (2008). 
  In contrast to textualism, intentionalist-based theories are based on the 
notion that the legislature’s intent or purpose should guide the court’s interpretive 
process. Hence, intentionalists seek out the specific intent of the enacting legislature, 
while purposivists seek out the general purpose of the statute. Id. at 22, 27. 
 11 JELLUM, supra note 10, at 17. For a general discussion of textualism, see 
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 
(2006); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated 
Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457 (2000). 
 12 These reasons are typically characterized as institutional, constitutional, 
and pragmatic reasons. See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 
1001, 1027-28 (2006). 
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exists.13 And even if it did, textualists doubt that judges can 
correctly identify that intent.14 Second, textualists are 
concerned about two aspects of the federal Constitution.15 They 
are concerned about separation of powers, as the Constitution 
grants the legislature the power to create laws16 and the 
judiciary the power to interpret laws.17 Textualists argue both 
that non-text-focused approaches to interpretation allow the 
judiciary to invade the legislature’s power and that they allow 
the legislature to invade the judiciary’s power.18 Additionally, 
textualists are anxious that the constitutionally prescribed 
legislative process—bicameralism and presentment—be 
followed.19 Because nontext sources, such as legislative history, 
do not go through this process, determining meaning from 
sources other than the text would be unconstitutional.20 Third, 
and finally, textualists suggest that textualism best 
  
 13 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural 
person, fictive for a collective body.” (citation omitted)) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Text, 
History, and Structure]; Manning, supra note 2, at 2410-13; Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 239, 244 (1992). 
  Textualists accept public choice theory, which cautions that legislation is 
the product of many different interest groups working in a chaotic environment to work 
out deals. Statutes generally reflect the compromises of this complex bargaining 
process. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63 (1988); Gold, supra note 1, at 34-35; John F. 
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2001); 
see Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (“[N]egotiations surrounding 
enactment of this bill tell a typical story of legislative battle among interest groups, 
Congress, and the President. . . . [A] change in any individual provision could have 
unraveled the whole.”). 
 14 Gold, supra note 1, at 37. 
 15 Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 13, at 68 (“[T]he 
structure of our Constitution . . . requires agreement on a text by two Houses of 
Congress and one President.”); Gold, supra note 1, at 38-39; Jonathan T. Molot, The 
Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (2006). 
 16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 17 Id. art. III, § 1. 
 18 Gold, supra note 1, at 38 (“[T]he concern with intentionalism is that the 
legislature would be encroaching on the judicial branch. . . . [and that judges are] 
abdicating their responsibility to interpret the text if they defer to the manner in which 
individual legislators interpret it.”). 
 19 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 20 Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism and the Interpretation of 
Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 843-44 (1991) (arguing that legislative 
history should not be used because “continuous and constant referral to legislative 
history tends to engage the Court in the interpretation of texts—committee reports or 
the utterances of various senators and representatives—that have never been enacted 
by both Houses of Congress or presented to the President”). 
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discourages judicial activism.21 For all these reasons, when 
interpreting statutes, textualists focus on intrinsic sources of 
meaning and avoid nontextual sources of meaning. But 
legislatures can be imperfect and text imprecise; thus, 
textualists have safety valves, doctrines that allow them to 
avoid the meaning of statutory text even when that text is very 
clear. One such safety value is the absurdity doctrine.22 
II. THE ABSURDITY DOCTRINE: A BRIEF PRIMER 
The plain meaning canon of statutory interpretation 
directs that statutes should be interpreted according to the 
ordinary meaning of their words.23 The absurdity doctrine, also 
known as the Golden Rule doctrine,24 is an exception to the 
plain meaning canon. The absurdity doctrine allows judges to 
ignore the ordinary meaning of statutory text when that 
ordinary meaning would lead to absurd outcomes.25 
  
 21 One famous quote from Judge Leventhal notes that using legislative 
history is like “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (quoting Patricia Wald, Some 
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 
IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)). 
 22 See supra note 2. 
 23 This article will use the term “plain meaning canon” to refer to the canon of 
interpretation and “ordinary meaning” to refer to the meaning of the text as 
determined after the plain meaning canon is applied. These terms are used 
interchangeably in the case law and by scholars. 
 24 Neil Duxbury, Golden Rule Reasoning, Moral Judgment, and the Law, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1529, 1530-31 (2009) (explaining why the absurdity doctrine is 
also known as the Golden Rule doctrine). 
 25 Absurdity is not consistently defined in the jurisprudence. Dougherty, 
supra note 2, at 133. But see Manning, supra note 2, at 2390 (“[S]tandard interpretive 
doctrine (perhaps tautologically) defines an ‘absurd result’ as an outcome so contrary to 
perceived social values that Congress could not have ‘intended’ it.”). Rather, judges 
often attempt to define absurdity by simply identifying, without explaining, other cases 
in which absurdity has been found. Dougherty, supra note 2, at 139-40; see, e.g., Pub. 
Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
  Even in the case that spawned this exception, Holy Trinity Church v. 
United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), the Supreme Court never explicitly defined 
absurdity. Instead, the Court merely suggested that a meaning that conflicted with 
congressional intent would be absurd. Id. at 459-61. Typically, the Court equates 
absurd with “odd” and “in conflict with Congressional intent.” See, e.g., Green v. Bock 
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989) (identifying the result as “odd”). Other 
courts identify absurdity as requiring a higher standard. Gold, supra note 1, at 78 
(“[N]o principled distinction separates grossly absurd applications from merely odd 
results.”). For example, in Robbins v. Chronister, the majority adopted Holy Trinity 
Church’s broad definition of absurdity, contrary to congressional intent, 402 F.3d 1047, 
1050 (10th Cir. 2005), rev’d en banc, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006), while the dissent 
adopted a much narrower definition—“lead[ing] to results so gross as to shock the 
general moral or common sense.” Id. at 1055. Which opinion in Robbins had a more 
accurate definition of absurdity? The majority’s definition of absurdity was so broad 
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Absurdity arises for a number of reasons, stemming 
from the difficulty of drafting precisely during a nonlineal 
legislative process. Thus, legislators draft generally applicable 
statutes that tend to be over- or underinclusive. That reality 
can produce odd outcomes that are seemingly inconsistent with 
legislative intent.26 Moreover, language is inherently imperfect 
and imprecise; hence, unintended errors may result.27 Finally, 
the legislative process is full of compromises and legislative 
jockeying, which can also lead to unanticipated results.28 In 
response, the absurdity doctrine recognizes and adjusts for the 
fact that sometimes the ordinary meaning of a statute is not 
what the enacting legislature intended. 
Proponents of the doctrine justify its use by arguing 
that Congress would never intend to enact a statute that has 
absurd consequences.29 Thus, when a statute would be absurd if 
implemented according to its ordinary meaning, a judge can 
legitimately refuse to follow the plain meaning canon simply by 
noting that applying the statute as written would be absurd. 
The absurdity doctrine then allows that judge to look to 
  
that it would essentially open the door for consideration of extratextual evidence in 
almost every case. This broad definition might be appealing to less strict textualists 
and nontextualist judges willing to look to extratextual sources relatively readily, but 
less appealing to others. But the dissent’s definition of absurdity is not much better. It 
sets such a high standard—a result that “shock[s] the general moral or common 
sense”—that it will be rarely, if ever, met. Id. The correct definition of absurdity must 
lie between these two extremes. Just where is not clear, and the jurisprudence is of 
little help. Most commonly, instead of defining absurdity, judges simply list other cases 
that have found absurdity, an “I know it when I sees it” analysis. 
 26 Manning, supra note 2, at 2394; see, e.g., Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 
459 (“[F]requently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to 
include an act in question, and yet a consideration of . . . the absurd results which follow 
from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the 
legislator intended to include the particular act.”). 
 27 See Manning, supra note 2, at 2400 (noting that “[l]egislators not only 
enact statutes within the constraints of limited time and bounded foresight, but also 
must rely on the imprecise medium of human language to express their intentions”). 
 28 For example, a statute may be:  
deliberately imprecise to accommodate political interests. . . . [C]areful 
draftsmanship is all too often absent; perhaps it is impossible in the crush of 
competing interests and activities that occur in the final moments of legislative 
enactments. Mistakes are made. In addition, a case that comes before the 
court . . . may present an issue that was not in the minds of . . . the legislators. 
John M. Walker, Jr., Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views on 
the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 204 (2001); accord Manning, 
supra note 2, at 2395 (“[B]ecause a statute’s apparently odd contours may reflect 
unknowable compromises or legislators’ behind-the-scenes strategic maneuvers, judges 
can rarely, if ever, tell if a law’s specific wording is unintentionally imprecise or was 
instead crafted to navigate the complex legislative process.”). 
 29 Manning, supra note 2, at 2400. 
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extratextual sources both to confirm that the absurd meaning 
was not intended and to identify the intended meaning.30 If, 
after reviewing the extratextual sources, a judge determines 
that the legislature did indeed intend the absurd result, then 
that result should control. But if the judge determines that 
absurdity was not intended, the judge can ignore the plain 
meaning canon. In essence, when a statute is absurd, a 
textualist judge has a choice: interpret the statute as written, 
which will force the legislature to correct any intended or 
unintended absurdity, or interpret the statute in a way that 
eliminates (or at least diminishes) that absurdity.31 
Absurdity is attractive to textualists precisely because it 
allows them to avoid the harsh results of their chosen theory. 
“The currently dominant version of textualism seems relatively 
attractive precisely because the absurdity doctrine provides an 
all-purpose backstop to the principle that judges must follow a 
clear text wherever it takes them.”32 Yet “[i]f modern textualists 
perceive their methodology to be workable only because of the 
availability of the absurdity doctrine, then one must question 
the conceptual foundations of textualism itself.”33 Viewed from 
this lens, the absurdity doctrine is merely a way for textualists 
to cheat. 
  
 30 But see Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is appropriate for judges to look to extra-
textualist sources to determine whether the absurd result was intended, but not to 
identify an alternative interpretation). 
 31 As noted by Professor John Manning: 
The absurdity doctrine thus rests on a judicial judgment that a particular 
statutory outcome, although prescribed by the text, would sharply contradict 
society’s “common sense” of morality, fairness, or some other deeply held value. 
As Chief Justice Marshall once put it, the doctrine authorizes judges to avoid 
results that “all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting.” Thus, 
despite being reserved only for exceptional cases, the absurdity doctrine serves 
an important legitimating function, making textualism more palatable by 
offering reassurance that the problem of statutory generality will not compel 
the acceptance of deeply troubling outcomes. The doctrine achieves that end, 
moreover, through seemingly benign presumptions about the legislative 
process: Why would legislators ever intentionally enact laws that apparently 
contradict commonly held values? Or, more accurately, why would judges ever 
presume that legislators intended such results, given the fact that legislators 
sometimes, perhaps often, express themselves imprecisely? Based on these 
assumptions, the Court has insisted that correcting apparent infelicities in 
statutory wording to avoid absurdity does not “substitut[e] . . . the will of the 
judge for that of the legislator.” 
Manning, supra note 2, at 2405-08 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 32 Id. at 2392. 
 33 Id.  
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABSURDITY DOCTRINE 
The absurdity doctrine was first adopted in this country 
in 1868. In United States v. Kirby,34 the Supreme Court 
dismissed an indictment charging members of the local sheriff’s 
office with violating a statute that prohibited anyone from 
“knowingly and willfully obstruct[ing] or retard[ing] the 
passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier.”35 The 
defendants had arrested a mail carrier who was wanted for 
murder while that mail carrier was delivering mail.36 Although 
the defendants had violated the clear terms of the statute, the 
Court dismissed the indictment. In doing so, the Court adopted 
the absurdity doctrine, explaining: 
All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms 
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, 
oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be 
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, 
which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in 
such cases should prevail over its letter.37 
In support of its decision to reject the clear text, the 
Court referenced two early decisions from Europe, both of 
which had rejected the ordinary meaning of a statute.38 First, a 
medieval Italian court had refused to punish a surgeon “who 
opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit” 
for violating a law punishing anyone “who[] drew blood in the 
streets.”39 Second, an English court had refused to punish a 
prisoner who had escaped from a prison that was on fire under 
a statute prohibiting prison escapes.40 In these two cases, the 
  
 34 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868). 
 35 Id. at 483-84. 
 36 Id. at 484. 
 37 Id. at 486-87. 
 38 It is not entirely clear whether the cases are real or hypothetical, but that 
is irrelevant for purposes of this article.  
 39 Kirby, 74 U.S. at 487 (“The common sense of man approves the judgment 
mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted, ‘that whoever drew 
blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,’ did not extend to the 
surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit.”). But note 
that drawing blood likely had different connotations. Specifically, one can draw blood 
during a fight or one can draw blood as a medical professional might do. Following the 
former meaning, as opposed to the latter, is consistent with textualism and does not 
require a finding of absurdity. Accord Gold, supra note 1, at 69 (indicating that words 
may have an established “social nuance” or “meaning”). 
 40 Kirby, 74 U.S. at 487 (“The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by 
Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks 
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courts deviated from the ordinary meaning of the statutes 
because application of the statute to the particular facts of each 
case led to a result not intended by the legislature. “[T]he 
absurdity doctrine therefore rests on the premise that if 
legislators had foreseen the problems raised by a specific 
statutory application, ‘they could and would have revised the 
legislation to avoid such absurd results.’”41 Relying on the 
rationale in these prior cases, the Supreme Court in Kirby 
rejected the clear statutory text and adopted the absurdity 
doctrine.42 In all three cases, the courts’ decisions to reject the 
clear text led to a result that seems just and fair.43  
In 1892, in its “most influential absurdity decision,”44 
Holy Trinity Church v. United States,45 the Supreme Court 
broadened the absurdity doctrine in two ways. First, the Court 
applied the doctrine to a case involving general absurdity. 
Second, the Court made clear the rationale for absurdity: to 
avoid a result that was contrary to legislative intent. The Alien 
Contract Labor Act prohibited businesses from bringing anyone 
into the country “to perform labor or service of any kind.”46 The 
defendant contracted with an individual from England to 
immigrate to the United States to serve as a pastor in its 
church.47 In response and pursuant to the ordinary meaning of 
the Act, the federal government sued the church to recover a 
statutory penalty.48 The Supreme Court rejected the 
government’s argument that “labor . . . of any kind” covered 
pastoral services.49 Stating that “[i]t is a familiar rule, that a 
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within 
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the 
intention of its makers,” the Court found the statute to be 
absurd and looked to the legislative history of the Act.50 
According to the Court, the legislative history was relatively 
  
prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the 
prison is on fire—‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.’”). 
 41 Staszewski, supra note 12, at 1007 (quoting Manning, supra note 2, at 2394).  
 42 Kirby, 74 U.S. at 486-87. 
 43 Manning, supra note 2, at 2402 (“These examples are powerful precisely 
because the imaginative reconstruction of legislative intent in each requires so little 
imagination.”). 
 44 Id. at 2403. 
 45 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 46 Id. at 458. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 458-59. 
 50 Id. at 459. 
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clear that the legislature intended the word labor to mean 
manual labor.51 Thus, the Court in Holy Trinity Church expanded 
Kirby’s narrow absurdity doctrine such that the ordinary 
meaning of statutory text could henceforth be ignored whenever 
that meaning contradicted the intent of the legislature, as 
gleaned from nontextual sources.52 Moreover, the Court, for the 
first time, applied the doctrine to invalidate the general 
application of a statute—exempting all “brain toilers,” as the 
Court called them53—rather than exempting one specific case. 
The absurdity doctrine was commonly used up until the 
1940s as a way to temper the sometimes harsh effects of the 
plain meaning canon in its literalist formulation.54 With the rise 
of intentionalism, the plain meaning cannon fell from favor; 
and thus, the absurdity doctrine faded briefly into obscurity.55 
Then, in 1986, Justice Scalia joined the Court. Part of his 
judicial mission has been to return statutory interpretation to a 
text-focused analysis. His approach has been dubbed “new 
textualism”56 and “modern textualism.”57 With this more text-
focused approach, the absurdity doctrine was revived. “A 
textualism that lacked this safety valve is unpalatable when 
courts are confronted with cases of true absurdity.”58 
Yet the revival has been limited. In recent years, the 
Supreme Court has explicitly relied on the absurdity doctrine 
only five times.59 Moreover, the Court has suggested that the 
  
 51 Id. at 463. 
 52 See Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892) (applying the 
absurdity doctrine to narrowly interpret the United States Chinese Restriction Act). 
 53 Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 464. 
 54 Unlike modern textualism, which allows consideration of textual context to 
discern ordinary meaning, literalism is a relatively rigid approach that rejects any 
source other than the words at issue. For a more thorough discussion, see Manning, 
supra note 2, at 2395-96, 2456-58. Cf. Staszewski, supra note 12, at 1003-04 (2006) 
(arguing that “the absurdity doctrine has identifiable constitutional underpinnings 
that justify its thoughtful use by the judiciary to avoid arbitrary or inequitable 
applications of facially valid rules in exceptional circumstances that were not 
anticipated by the legislature”). 
 55 JELLUM, supra note 10, at 74.  
 56 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 
(1990) (coining the phrase “new textualism”). 
 57 Molot, supra note 15, at 2 (identifying Justice Scalia’s version of textualism 
as “modern textualism”). 
 58 Gold, supra note 1, at 62. 
 59 Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1998) (invoking doctrine to 
expand the meaning of “individuals” to include corporations as those who could seek 
expedited review under Line Item Veto Act); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 
513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (holding it would be absurd to apply the term “knowingly” only 
to relevant verbs in criminal statute and not to elements of the crime concerning minor 
age of participant and sexually explicit nature of material); Burns v. United States, 501 
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doctrine is one of last resort, “rarely invoke[d] . . . to override 
unambiguous legislation.”60 As Justice Kennedy noted, “the 
potential of this doctrine to allow judges to substitute their 
personal predilections for the will of the Congress is so self-
evident from the case which spawned it [Holy Trinity Church] as 
to require no further discussion of its susceptibility to abuse.”61 
While the justices of the Supreme Court turn to the doctrine 
increasingly rarely, to date, they have never rejected the 
doctrine outright. Indeed, in rejecting the application of the 
doctrine in particular cases, the justices have reaffirmed the 
doctrine’s continued vitality.62 Furthermore, the doctrine, despite 
its flaws, is alive and well in the lower federal63 and state 
courts.64 
IV. TYPES OF ABSURDITY 
One area that has not yet been explored in legal 
scholarship is whether the type of absurdity, general or 
  
U.S. 129, 135-37 (1991) (relying on absurdity to hold that district courts may not 
depart upward from sentencing range established by Sentencing Guidelines without 
first notifying parties of court’s intent to depart); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
491 U.S. 440, 451, 454-55 (1989) (relying on absurdity, in part, to narrowly interpret 
“advisory committee” in the Federal Advisory Committee Act); Green v. Bock Laundry 
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989) (some justices reasoned that it would be absurd 
not to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) to civil as well as criminal defendants). 
 60 Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 441 (2002). 
 61 Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 474 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 62 See, e.g., Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516 (1997); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 519 U.S. 248, 261 (1997); Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 200 
(1993); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1991); EEOC v. Commercial 
Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 108, 120 (1988). 
 63 See, e.g., Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 
2005) (holding that “less” should be read to say “more”); accord Amalgamated Transit 
Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(same). But see Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 
448 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the court’s 
holding and arguing that the majority “ignored the deference we must give to the 
supremacy of the legislature”). 
 64 See, e.g., Newman v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 976 A.2d 698, 702 (Conn. 
2009) (“When more than one construction is possible, we adopt the one that renders the 
enactment effective and workable and reject any that might lead to unreasonable or 
bizarre results.” (quoting Graff v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 894 A.2d 285 (Conn. 2006)); 
Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1270 (Fla. 
2008) (“We have long held that the Court should not interpret a statute in a manner 
resulting in unreasonable, harsh, or absurd consequences.”); Staley v. State, 672 S.E.2d 
615, 616 (Ga. 2009) (applying the absurdity doctrine to hold that a statute 
criminalizing child molestation did not apply just to molestation of lineal descendents 
of the molester), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2737 (2009). See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D 
Statutes § 172 (2009) (collecting cases). 
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specific, should impact the analysis. While the cases and 
literature generally do not distinguish between these two types 
of absurdity, they are different. Specific absurdity refers to a 
statute that is absurd only in the particular situation. General 
absurdity refers to a statute that is absurd regardless of the 
particular situation. 
Let me begin with examples of specific absurdity. Ohio 
Division of Wildlife v. Clifton,65 involved a case of specific 
absurdity. The defendant in that case had rescued a squirrel 
and kept it for a pet.66 The squirrel, Angele Daniel Nicole, had 
run of the house. All would have been well, except that the 
defendant entered the squirrel in a parade and won first prize 
for most unusual pet.67 After the squirrel’s picture appeared in 
the newspaper, two officers from the Wildlife Division appeared 
and told the defendant that the squirrel had to be released to 
the wild.68 She refused and was fined pursuant to a statute 
prohibiting individuals from owning “fur-bearing animals” 
without a license.69 Despite the clear language of the text, the 
trial court dismissed the case and chastised the state for fining 
her, saying, “[t]his makes no sense. Even a child could see that 
there is no justice or right in the position of the state.”70 The 
trial court reasoned that the purpose of the specific statute—
and criminal justice generally—would not be furthered by 
incarcerating or fining the humanitarian defendant.71 
A statute that prohibits people from keeping wild 
animals as pets might be absurd as applied to a person who 
  
 65 89 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Mun. Ct. 1997). 
 66 Id. at 2. 
 67 Id.  
 68 Id. at 2-3. For additional background information on this case, see The State of 
Ohio Persecuted a Squirrel—and It’s [sic] Rescuer!, GODDESSCHESS BLOG (Feb. 8, 2008), 
http://goddesschess.blogspot.com/2008/02/state-of-ohio-persecuted-squirrel-and.html. 
 69 Clifton, 89 Ohio Misc. 2d at 3. 
 70 Id. at 8, 9. 
 71 The court included the following gem: 
The court hereby announces a pearl, 
It’s sometimes OK to have a squirrel. 
The legislature did a statute create, 
The Wildlife Division obviously did not equate. 
The necessity to be kind, thorough and specific, 
The lack of these is legally terrific. 
The result is this very short epistle, 
The defendant/squirrel is granted a dismissal. 
Id. at 9. 
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rescued an injured squirrel.72 But the statute, as generally 
applied, would not be absurd: for health and safety reasons, we 
do not want people keeping wild animals, including squirrels, 
in their homes. Thus, this statute might be absurd in its 
specific application to the rescued squirrel, but would not be 
absurd in general. 
Many of the Supreme Court’s absurdity cases involve 
specific absurdity, as we saw with the earliest cases identified 
above, including the surgeon who drew blood, the prisoner who 
escaped from a burning prison, and the sheriff who arrested 
the mail carrier who was wanted for murder. There are more 
recent examples as well. For example, in Public Citizen v. 
United States Department of Justice,73 the Court relied on the 
absurdity doctrine to avoid the ordinary meaning of the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, which imposed detailed 
registration and open-meeting requirements on federal 
“advisory committees.”74 “Advisory committee” was defined in 
the statute as any committee “utilized by the President . . . in 
the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations.”75 At issue 
in the case was whether a subcommittee of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) was an “advisory committee.”76 Pursuant to 
the ordinary meaning of the Act, the ABA subcommittee was 
an advisory committee because the President routinely sought 
its recommendations on judicial nominees.77 
But the majority refused to adopt the ordinary meaning 
of the Act, citing Holy Trinity Church.78 Because the Court 
found it “difficult to fathom” that Congress would have 
intended an interpretation of the statute that “compel[led] an 
odd result,” the Court searched “for other evidence of 
congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.”79 
According to the majority, the statute was enacted to cure 
specific ills—namely the wasteful expenditure of public funds 
for worthless committee meetings and biased proposals by 
special interest groups.80 The Court concluded that it was thus 
  
 72 See, e.g., id. at 3, 8. 
 73 491 U.S. 440 (1989). 
 74 Id. at 446-47. 
 75 Id. at 451 (citing 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (1982)). 
 76 Id. at 447. 
 77 Id. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 78 Id. at 454 (majority opinion) (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 
U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). 
 79 Id. at 454-55. 
 80 Id. at 453. 
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unlikely that Congress intended the statute to cover every 
formal and informal meeting between the President and a 
group rendering advice.81 Ultimately, the Court held that the 
statute did not apply to this specific ABA subcommittee.82 
Now let me turn to examples of general absurdity. A 
statute is generally absurd when that statute is absurd 
regardless of the particular situation before the court. The facts 
of a particular case do not matter. Thus, a statute that unduly 
burdens a civil plaintiff’s ability to present his or her case but 
not a civil defendant’s is generally absurd because it would 
affect all civil plaintiffs and defendants. These are the facts of 
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,83 in which the Court 
rejected the ordinary meaning of the word “defendant” in Rule 
609(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.84 When admitting 
evidence that a witness had been convicted of a felony, that 
Rule, as then in effect, required a court to balance “the 
probative value of admitting th[e] evidence [with] the 
prejudicial effect to the defendant.”85 While the ordinary 
meaning of “defendant” includes both civil and criminal 
defendants, the majority held that that meaning would be 
“odd” because such an interpretation would deny a civil 
plaintiff the same right to impeach a witness that a civil 
defendant would have.86 Thus, this interpretation would raise 
due process concerns.87 Reviewing the legislative history, the 
Court concluded that the legislature more likely intended 
“defendant” to mean “criminal defendant.”88 Thus, Bock 
involved general absurdity because the facts of the particular 
case before the Court were irrelevant and the statute was 
interpreted to exclude an entire class of litigants. 
Similarly, Holy Trinity Church—the case that 
broadened the absurdity exception—also involved general 
absurdity. The Supreme Court held that it was not absurd for 
  
 81 Id. at 467. 
 82 Id. (noting that the constitutional avoidance doctrine also supported this 
holding). 
 83 490 U.S. 504 (1989). 
 84 Id. at 527. 
 85 Id. at 509 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86 Id.  
 87 For this reason, Justice Scalia has indicated that the case would have been 
better resolved under the constitutional avoidance doctrine. Gold supra note 1, at 59 (citing 
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 88 Bock, 490 U.S. at 511-24. 
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Congress to prohibit the importation of any specific individual 
so much as it was absurd for Congress to prohibit the 
importation of all “brain toilers.”89 A more recent case, Robbins 
v. Chronister,90 also involved general absurdity. In Robbins, the 
Tenth Circuit reviewed a prisoner’s request for attorney’s fees 
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).91 After 
entering prison, the prisoner filed a civil rights action for 
injuries he sustained during his arrest, and won only nominal 
damages.92 The PLRA capped attorney’s fees at 150% of 
awarded damages “[i]n any action brought by a prisoner.”93 
Thus, according to the clear text of the PLRA, the plaintiff was 
entitled to only $1.50 in attorney’s fees because he was a 
prisoner when he filed his case and because he only won one 
dollar in damages.94 The majority found the statute absurd as 
generally applied because the majority believed that Congress 
intended to cap damages only for prison-condition litigation, 
not for prisoner-filed litigation.95 The statute was absurd, 
therefore, as applied to all claims filed by prisoners that related 
to issues other than prison conditions.96 Thus, the statute was 
generally absurd because the facts of the specific case were not 
relevant to the disposition of the case and because the court 
interpreted the statute to exclude an entire class of litigants. 
Finally, in Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. 
Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit used general 
absurdity to hold that “less” actually means “more.”97 In that 
case, the court rejected the plain meaning of the text of the 
Class Action Fairness Act. That Act provided that “a court of 
appeals may accept an appeal . . . [in certain cases] if 
application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days 
  
 89 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1892). 
 90 402 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2005), rev’d en banc 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 91 Id. at 1049; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2000). 
 92 Robbins, 402 F.3d at 1049. 
 93 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)). 
 94 Id. at 1050. 
 95 Id. at 1054-55. The majority and dissent sparred over whether this result 
was absurd. The majority acknowledged that the language of the statute was clear, but 
concluded that the statute was absurd because it would produce “an illogical result” at 
odds with congressional intent. Id. at 1050, 1054. “[I]t would be absurd to limit [a 
plaintiff’s] attorney’s fees merely because he happened to file his pre-existing 
constitutional claim while he was in prison.” Id. at 1054-55. In contrast, the dissent 
argued that a statute is absurd only when an interpretation “leads to ‘results so gross 
as to shock the general moral or common sense.’” Id. at 1055 (Hartz, J., dissenting) 
(quoting United States v. Newsome, 898 F.2d 119, 121 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 96 Id. at 1054 (majority opinion). 
 97 435 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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after entry of the order.”98 The ordinary meaning of the text of 
the statute imposed a seven day waiting period to appeal and 
contained no upper limit on that waiting period.99 The Ninth 
Circuit found this interpretation “illogical” and turned to the 
purpose of the Act.100 The court concluded that Congress had 
intended the Act to impose a time limit for appealing rather 
than a waiting period.101 
V. WHY SPECIFIC ABSURDITY UNDERMINES TEXTUALISM 
To be sure, the difference between general and specific 
absurdity is not bright lined. One could ask: At what point do 
the specific facts become relevant to an absurdity finding? It is 
easy in some cases to see that the absurdity is apparent only 
when the facts of the case are considered. For instance, a statute 
that prohibits individuals from interfering with the delivery of 
mail only becomes absurd when it is applied to a sheriff 
arresting a mail carrier wanted for murder. A statute that 
prohibits anyone from drawing blood in the street only becomes 
absurd when applied to a doctor offering medical treatment. A 
statute that prohibits anyone from owning a fur-bearing animal 
only becomes absurd when applied to a person who rescued a 
squirrel that would otherwise die. A statute that prohibits 
prisoners from escaping from prison only becomes absurd when 
applied to a prisoner who escaped from a prison that was on fire. 
In each of these cases, the applicable statutes are perfectly 
logical in the abstract, but when the statute is applied to the 
specific facts of the case before the court, the “results [are] ‘so 
  
 98 Id. at 1142 (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2000)). 
 99 Id. at 1145. 
 100 Id. at 1146. Notably, the majority found this purpose relying on a senate 
report that “was not submitted until eighteen days after the Senate had passed the bill, 
eleven days after the House had passed the bill, and ten days after the President 
signed the bill into law.” Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit 
Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 101 Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d at 1146. Judge Bybee sua sponte 
called for an en banc rehearing, which was denied. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 
F.3d at 1094 (Bybee, J., dissenting). He then wrote a dissent from the order denying 
rehearing, an unusual occurrence. Id. In his dissent, Judge Bybee chastised the 
majority for rejecting the plain meaning of the statute when the text was so clear. 
According to the dissent, none of the reasons for avoiding the plain meaning canon 
applied; hence, Congress, not the courts, should correct the statute. Id. at 1096-98. He 
was particularly concerned that the majority relied on legislative history that no 
member of Congress or the President ever saw to interpret the statute to mean the 
exact opposite of what it said. Id. 
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gross as to shock the general moral or common sense.’”102 In other 
words, as applied to the specific situation before the court, a 
situation unlikely to repeat itself, the statute is absurd. In these 
cases, the absurdity is downright shocking. 
In contrast, statutes that are generally absurd are 
absurd not because they are shocking, but because they are 
simply contrary to congressional intent. Thus, a statute that 
prohibits the importation of brain toilers is not shocking, just 
unintended. A statute that imposes a waiting period for filing 
an appeal rather than a deadline is not shocking, just sloppy. A 
statute that purports to treat civil defendants and civil 
plaintiffs differently is not shocking, just poorly considered. 
Another important distinction between general and 
specific absurdity is that general absurdity is often readily 
apparent from the text of the statute itself. The specific facts of 
the case will play little, if any, role. While the facts of the case 
may bring the absurdity to light—a cap on attorney’s fees for 
prisoner-filed litigation does not seem absurd until that cap 
limits recovery of fees to $1.50—the facts are not essential to 
either the absurdity finding or a court’s interpretation. In other 
words, the PLRA was not absurd because it limited fees to 
$1.50; rather, the statute was absurd because it limited fees in 
all cases in which the person filing a claim was a prisoner, 
regardless of whether the claim related to prison-condition 
litigation. Also, a statute that prohibits the importation of 
anyone performing labor or service of any kind is absurd, if at 
all, only when applied to all brain toilers, not just pastors. A 
statute that allows a judge to weigh the probative versus 
prejudicial effect of a witness’s prior conviction is absurd when 
applied to all civil plaintiffs, not just a plaintiff who has lost his 
arm. A statute that imposes a waiting period for filing an 
appeal rather than a time limit in which to file is absurd in all 
cases. In each of these examples, the applicable statute is 
illogical as written and as generally applied. It is not absurd as 
applied to just the specific individual before the court. You 
might think of the difference in this way: when a statute is 
generally absurd, Congress did not intend to draft the statute 
as written and likely, if given a chance, would redraft. The 
facts of the case merely bring this point to light. In contrast, 
when a statute is specifically absurd, Congress intended to 
  
 102 Robbins v. Chronister, 402 F.3d 1047, 1055 (10th Cir. 2005) (Hartz, J., 
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Newsome, 898 F.2d 119, 121 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990), 
rev’d en banc, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
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draft the statute as written and likely, if given a chance, would 
not redraft, other than to except the isolated situation before 
the court. In short, in one case, Congress did its job poorly, 
while in the other case, Congress did its job well. 
With statutes that are generally absurd, the absurdity 
is often caused by drafting error103 or the hubbub of the 
legislative process.104 For this reason, cases of general absurdity 
are rarer than cases of specific absurdity precisely because it is 
unusual for Congress to get it so wrong. Importantly, even 
when Congress does err in its drafting, judges have other 
doctrines they can rely on to avoid the absurd result. For 
example, a judge could apply the constitutional avoidance 
doctrine,105 as the majority should have done in Green, or could 
apply the scrivener’s error exception,106 as the majority should 
have done in Amalgamated Transit. Like the absurdity 
doctrine, both of these doctrines allow textualists to avoid the 
ordinary meaning of a clear statute. 
For purposes of this article, general absurdity is often 
apparent and resolvable with intrinsic sources, including the 
textual context. Illustratively, when I misspeak, my listener 
often knows what I meant from the rest of the words. Similarly, 
when a statute provides that litigants have a seven day waiting 
period to appeal, the absurdity and fix are both readily 
apparent from the textual context. Because general absurdity 
can be resolved using intrinsic sources, turning to absurdity to 
avoid clear language in cases of general absurdity does not 
undermine textualism, at least not to the same extent that 
specific absurdity does. 
In contrast, specific absurdity is neither facially 
apparent nor resolvable with intrinsic sources. Again 
  
 103 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989). 
 104 See, e.g., In re Butler, 186 B.R. 371, 372 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (“It has been 
said that one should never watch laws or sausage being made.”); Adrian Vermeule, 
Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy 
Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1844-50 (1998) (debunking the myth that 
legislative time pressure created the ambiguity in the Alien Contract Labor Act at 
issue in Holy Trinity Church). 
 105 The constitutional avoidance doctrine directs that when there are two 
reasonable interpretations of statutory language, one of which raises constitutional 
issues and one of which does not, the statute should be interpreted in a way that does 
not raise the constitutional issue. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See generally JELLUM, supra note 10, at 77-78, 235-37. 
 106 The scrivener’s error exception to the plain meaning rule allows judges to 
correct obvious clerical or typographical errors. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. 
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993). See generally JELLUM, supra note 10, at 
75-77. 
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illustratively, when I speak more broadly or narrowly than I 
intended, my listener is unlikely to know my boundaries, and 
my other words are less likely to make those boundaries clear. 
Similarly, when a statute provides that prisoners should not 
escape from prison, there is no apparent absurdity. Yet when 
the statute is applied to a specific case in which a prisoner 
escaped to save his life, the boundaries become uncertain, and 
the application clearly absurd. Thus, specific absurdity comes 
to light only when the facts of a specific case come into play.107 
Resolving specific absurdity often requires a judge to determine 
whether excepting the situation before the court will further 
the purpose of the statute or otherwise be consistent with the 
legislature’s intent. For example, a statute that prohibits 
individuals from drawing blood in the streets is not absurd 
until applied to a doctor offering medical care. But in deciding 
whether to except the doctor from the statute’s reach, a judge 
should consider the purpose of the statute. If the purpose of the 
statute was to prohibit individuals from fighting in the streets, 
then excepting the doctor would be consistent with that 
purpose. If the purpose of the statute was to protect public 
health by keeping blood—which is unsanitary—off the street, 
then excepting the doctor would be inconsistent with that 
purpose. Hence, specific absurdity often must be resolved 
through nontextual sources such as legislative history and 
unexpressed purpose. Because specific absurdity requires 
judges to resort to nontextual sources to determine statutory 
meaning, specific absurdity undermines textualism. 
Assuming this analysis to be correct, it results in an 
oddity: textualist judges can intervene only when judicial 
intervention is less necessary. Let me explain. When a statute 
is specifically absurd, Congress is unlikely to amend that 
statute to correct the absurdity because it is unlikely to recur. 
Although the absurdity did manifest in one isolated case, the 
exact circumstances are unlikely to ever occur again; hence, 
Congress has little incentive to act. Moreover, Congress has a 
good reason not to act; the statute as generally applied does 
exactly what Congress intended the statute to do. Why mess 
with a perfectly good statute? No statutory language can ever 
be perfect. Thus, there will always be cases that may fit within 
the ordinary meaning of the text of a statute and to which the 
  
 107 While it is legitimate for all judges to examine the facts of the case before 
them, textualists assert that people should be able to understand a statute as written 
without resort to other sources. 
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statute should not apply. Consequently, it is precisely in these 
cases that a court should step in and correct the resulting 
injustice even though stepping in to resolve cases of specific 
absurdity violates textualist principles. 
Moreover, suggesting that, in cases of specific absurdity, 
judges do not have the power to intervene and prevent injustice 
is, in a word, absurd! The U.S. Constitution grants the 
legislature the power to draft and enact laws.108 It also grants 
the judiciary the power to interpret those laws:109 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, 
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. . . . This is of the 
very essence of judicial duty.110 
The judiciary interprets laws passed by the legislature only in 
the course of adjudicating a case.111 There is little reason to 
have a sophisticated judiciary as a coequal branch of 
government if all that the judiciary is allowed to do is apply 
statutes blindly without considering the justice of the 
application. Without a check by the judiciary, those convicted of 
laws that were not intended to apply to their circumstance will 
have no recourse. But “[n]o right of the victim is advanced, and 
no interest of the state served, by incarcerating the innocent.”112 
Rather, a court’s fundamental power is “to decide cases 
according to [its] own legal interpretations and factual 
findings”113 and “to render dispositive judgments.”114 To remove 
this power from judges would elevate the role of the legislature 
at the expense of the judiciary. 
In contrast, when a statute is generally absurd, 
Congress is more likely to amend that statute to correct the 
absurdity because it is almost certain to recur. The absurdity 
  
 108 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 109 Id. art. III, § 1.  
 110 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). 
 111 “A fundamental precept of the federal constitutional structure . . . is the 
distinction between a legislature’s power to enact laws and a court’s authority to 
interpret them in the course of adjudicating a case.” William D. Araiza, The Trouble 
with Robertson: Equal Protection, The Separation of Powers, and the Line Between 
Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1055 
(1999) (criticizing the Court’s holding in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 
429 (1992), for failing to check legislative usurpation of judicial power). 
 112 Ohio Div. of Wildlife v. Clifton, 89 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 7 (Mun. Ct. 1997) 
(quoting State v. Aldridge, 697 N.E.2d 228, 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)). 
 113 Araiza, supra note 111, at 1073. 
 114 Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 
926 (1990). 
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will manifest in every case, or at least in a large number of 
cases, because Congress crafted a statute it never intended to 
draft. The statute, as generally applied, does not do what 
Congress intended the statute to do. The language is not just 
imperfect or imprecise, it is wrong; thus, Congress has a good 
reason to act. Hence, it is less important that a court intervene 
in cases of general absurdity because Congress has more 
incentive to fix such a statute. Indeed, that is exactly what 
happened after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Mississippi 
Poultry Ass’n v. Madigan.115 At issue in that case were the 1985 
amendments to § 466(d) of the Poultry Products Inspection 
Act.116 That Act specifically required that all imported poultry 
products “be subject to the same . . . standards applied . . . in 
the United States.”117 The relevant agency had promulgated a 
regulation interpreting this Act to require that the foreign 
system requirements be “at least equal to” U.S. standards.118 A 
lawsuit ensued, and a three judge panel heard the case.119 The 
majority found the language “the same” clear—it meant 
identical—and rejected the agency’s interpretation.120 Yet the 
majority’s interpretation imposed an unintended trade barrier. 
No foreign country’s poultry could enter the United States 
because the foreign country’s inspection system could never be 
“identical” to the U.S. system.121 It is unlikely that Congress 
  
 115 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d en banc, 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 116 Id. at 1361; 21 U.S.C. § 466(d)(1)(A) (1995). 
 117 21 U.S.C. § 466(d)(1)(A).  
 118 Requirements for Imported Poultry Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,963 (May 1, 
1987) (codified at 9 C.F.R. § 381.196) (emphasis added). 
 119 Miss. Poultry Ass’n v. Madigan, 790 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Miss. 
Poultry Ass’n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993). Later, the court on its own 
motion ordered a rehearing. Miss. Poultry Ass’n v. Madigan, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 120 Miss. Poultry Ass’n, 31 F.3d at 310. To determine whether the language 
was clear, the majority in the initial hearing looked first to a dictionary and concluded 
that “any fair reading of the dictionary definition of ‘the same’ overwhelmingly 
demonstrate[d] that ‘the same’ [was] congruent with ‘identical.’” Miss. Poultry Ass’n, 
992 F.2d at 1364. While the majority acknowledged that secondary dictionary 
definitions included synonyms of “equivalent,” such as “closely similar” and 
“comparable,” the majority reasoned that substituting “at least equal to” for “the same 
as” made no sense in this case because Congress used “at least equal to” to mean 
equivalent in other sections of the Act. Id. For example, Congress required states and 
territories to have poultry processes “at least equal to” the federal system. Id. at 1364 
n.28 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 466(d) (1988)). Additionally, Congress had used “the same” in 
other parts of the Act. Id. at 1363 n.26. Because Congress had used both “the same” 
and “at least equal to” in other parts of the Act, the majority reasoned that when 
Congress wanted to use an equivalency standard, it knew how to do so. Id. at 1364. 
 121 See Miss. Poultry Ass’n, 992 F.2d. at 1378 (Reavley, J., dissenting) 
(commenting on how “[t]he facts of [the] case provide no basis on which to hold that 
Congress ‘directly spoke[] to the precise question’ of whether section 466(d) mandates 
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intended to enact such a trade barrier when it amended this 
Act.122 Simply put, the statute was generally absurd when 
interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. Yet despite a 
rehearing before the full panel, the Fifth Circuit clung to its 
textualist interpretation.123 Not surprisingly, shortly after the 
case was decided, Congress immediately amended the Act to 
replace “the same” with “equivalent to,” thereby removing the 
judicially imposed trade barrier.124 Thus, when Congress crafts 
a generally absurd statute, Congress can and does correct its 
mistake. 
In light of the distinction between specific and general 
absurdity, textualists should rethink the absurdity safety 
valve. As demonstrated, they should be especially loath to 
apply the doctrine in cases of specific, as opposed to general, 
absurdity because specific absurdity is neither apparent nor 
resolvable from the text. Yet it is precisely in cases of specific 
absurdity that judicial intervention is needed most. Textualists 
neither recognize this distinction nor appreciate how it 
undermines textualism’s underpinnings.  
CONCLUSION 
Absurdity is a textualist’s fail-safe doctrine; it provides 
an out when they are faced with the reality that their approach 
simply will not work in a given case. Whereas purposivists and 
intentionalists do not need such a doctrine to reject clear text, 
textualists do. But the need for this doctrine proves the 
shortcomings of textualism: judges should apply the clear text, 
except when they should not. 
Because the absurdity doctrine allows judges to avoid 
the ordinary meaning of the text and rewrite the statute to 
conform to the intent of Congress, textualists should approach 
the doctrine with caution and use it sparingly, if at all. Many 
textualists do advocate a narrow application of the absurdity 
and scrivener’s error doctrines. But as noted elsewhere: 
  
identicality” (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 841 (1984))). 
 122 The dissent found it inconceivable that Congress would enact a statute with 
such major trade implications without talking about “why a barrier was justified, what it 
was supposed to accomplish, or how its effectiveness would be monitored.” Id. at 1364. 
 123 Miss. Poultry Ass’n, 31 F.3d at 310. 
 124 Poultry Products Inspection Act § 431(k)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 466(d)(1) (1994). 
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Even narrow versions of these doctrines undercut textualist 
principles to the extent courts are permitted to consider policy or 
legislative intent that runs contrary to unambiguous statutory 
language. . . . Potentially, the benefits from having these doctrines as 
an option do not counterbalance the effects of courts and litigators 
that read them broadly.125 
Because it is neither apparent nor resolvable from text alone, 
specific absurdity, in particular, is problematic for textualists. 
At bottom, specific absurdity and textualism are simply 
incompatible.126 Yet it is precisely when statutes are specifically 
absurd that judges should be willing to consider nontextualist 
sources and craft appropriate exceptions because Congress will 
not do so. Hence, the absurdity doctrine demonstrates the 
failings of textualism. 
  
 125 Gold, supra note 1, at 60-61 (citing Siegel, supra note 2, at 325 n.73 for 
examples of British cases rejecting the absurdity doctrine and Michael S. Fried, A 
Theory of Scrivener’s Error, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 589, 596 (2000) for examples of British 
cases rejecting the scrivener’s error doctrine). 
 126 But see id. at 61 n.207 (citing JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, Textualism’s 
Exceptions, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2002)) (disagreeing with those who 
argue that the absurdity and scrivener’s error doctrines contradict textualism). Gold 
proposes a theory of absurdity that supports textualism: 
This article proposes a different solution for absurd results: a clear statutory 
text is not actually disregarded when the absurdity doctrine is applied. Instead, 
the absurdity doctrine is triggered by those highly unusual situations in which 
a presumed legislative intent is in conflict with a “literal” application of 
statutory language. In those instances, the objective meaning of the statute to a 
competent user of the language is distinct from its otherwise literal meaning. 
Id. at 64. He suggests further that the proper treatment of scrivener’s errors requires 
that “when a drafting error is sufficiently obvious from a reasonable reading of a 
statute that it could not represent what Congress intended to write, the court should 
read the statute as if the error had been corrected.” Id. at 74-75.  
So understood, neither the absurdity doctrine nor the scrivener’s error doctrine 
is an exception to textualism. They simply provide additional evidence that 
textualism diverges from literalism. Textualism’s purported exceptions fit 
nicely with the idea that courts “do not inquire what the legislature meant,” but 
“ask only what the statute means.”  
Id. at 84-85. 
